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attacked de Grasse off the capes of the Chesapeake with the tactics of Rodney, he would probably have defeated de Grasse as did Rodney. In such case Graves, instead of de Grasse, would have entered the Chesapeake; Cornwallis would have been rescued from his peril; the British would have had complete command of the sea; the long march of the allies southward would have come to naught; and the whole struggle would have assumed another and a most disheartening aspect. It is in such studies that the importance of such books lies.

*Histoire de France depuis les Origines jusqu'à la Révolution.* (Publiée sous la direction de M. ERNEST LAVISSE.) Tome VI., 2. *Henri IV. et Louis XIII. (1598-1643).* Par JEAN H. MARIÉJOL, Professeur à l'Université de Lyon. (Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1905. Pp. 493.)

THIS volume is an improvement upon the one which immediately precedes it from the same pen. M. Mariéjol excels in the writing of purely political and diplomatic history, and is farther away, in the seventeenth century, from certain prejudices that compromise his earlier production. Like each volume in the series, the present one deals with the entire history of France during a given time—in this case France from 1598 to 1643. But as a matter of fact it resolves itself into a series of studies in politics and diplomacy, united by shorter intermediate essays upon the culture-history of the period. This duality sometimes embarrasses the reader, for he does not always see things in their relations or appreciate the full bearing of certain events. Moreover, the internal and the external history of France are treated so separately that the reciprocal influence of events within and events without is sometimes missed. If the book had been written by different authors, as some of the series have been and as the Cambridge series is throughout, it probably would not have exhibited greater variance in this particular. A good example of this is the treatment of Richelieu's dealings in Italy in 1629.

The first book, which deals with the history of Henry IV. after the Edict of Nantes, is of a double nature, being an epilogue to the period of the civil wars and a prologue to the era of Richelieu. There are admirable studies in this part of Henry IV.'s reconstructive policy, of Sully's economies, and above all of the foreign policy of the first Bourbon. In this writing the author has rightly relied a good deal upon Philippson and Rott. But he has too closely followed Henrard's *Henri IV. et la Princesse de Condé* in the account of Henry's proposed intervention in Clèves. He minimizes the political thought of Henry IV. and exaggerates his passion. Even admitting that the king's love for the fair Charlotte this time did influence him politically (as never had been the case before), it nevertheless remains true that political necessity required firm conduct on Henry's part toward Spain. The Prince of Condé had been making so extravagant a display of Huguenot inclina-

tions that he was rightfully under suspicion of conspiracy, as Bouillon had been. Nothing decisive has yet been proved as to a direct understanding between Condé and Spain, but his slur upon the legitimacy of the dauphin had the active support of Spain and the papal nuncio. It would be hard to believe, if we did not have irrefutable proof of it, that Condé's ambitious effrontery went so far. Moreover, among the evidence at the trial of the Marshal Biron there was a memorandum in which Jean de la Fin, his former confidant, accused Biron of aiming to dissolve the traditional monarchy and to establish the government in the hands of the nobles and peers of the realm, who were to choose an elective ruler after the manner of Germany. The import of such information could not have escaped Henry IV.

Book II., dealing with the abandonment of Henry's foreign policy, the Spanish marriage, the Estates-General of 1614, and the trouble with court parties and the Huguenots, is excellent. Few issues of this period are debatable. The deterioration of power was so complete and the causes of it so evident that treatment of the subject becomes a matter of discretion in the choice of material, not of discrimination as to the motives and policy of the principals. The same observation, in a measure, is true also of book III., "*Le Ministère de Richelieu*". Since the publication of the correspondence of the cardinal by the Viscount d'Avenel, there is no room to doubt the greatness or the patriotism of the minister who "made his master the first man in Europe and the second man in France". The bearing of Italy upon the policy of Gustavus Adolphus is not made so clear as it should be, and the point of Charnacé's mission is obscured. The Swedish king saw the magnitude of the danger in which he was likely to become involved in Germany, and wanted, above all, to secure himself against too great odds. Accordingly he demanded the promise of the French not to make peace in Italy without his consent. This Richelieu refused to do; he was not willing to sacrifice the ends of France to the advantage of Sweden; hence, when the time came, he signed the peace of Rivalta, September 4, 1630, even at the risk of offending Sweden. It might be added that a paragraph recapitulating the connection between the Gonzagas of Mantua and the Nevers family in France in the sixteenth century would have made the Mantuan question clearer.

The chapter on the political ideas of Richelieu is admirable, being based on an intimate study of the *Testament Politique*. The bibliographies, as usual, are excellent. But the interesting study, "Richelieu Ingénieur", by Captain De la Barre Duparcq, in the *Compte rendu* of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques for 1869 (V<sup>e</sup> série, XIX. 161-255) should be added to the list of authorities at the beginning of book III., chapter 3.

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